Why Did the ACA Co-Op Program Fail? Lessons for the Health Reform Debate.

The ACA created a new type of nonprofit health insurance entity, the "Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan" ("co-op"). Most of the newly created co-ops soon lost money, and only 4 of the original 23 remain. We interviewed key stakeholders and conducted in-depth case studies of 3 of these co-ops. We discovered that politicians and regulators made it unlikely the program could succeed, that most of the co-ops did not have the management capacity to overcome these political obstacles, and that even those with good managers lacked the needed fiscal resilience. We also considered lessons suggested for those proposing a newly created "public option." The main one is that a successful public option requires a supportive political environment, strong management, and significant fiscal capacity, none of which comes easily. A better route may be a quasi-public option in which the government subcontracts the operation of its newly created plan to a private firm. Although it is uncertain whether federal regulators have the capacity to hold such private for-profit firms accountable, pragmatism suggests that a combination of public-sector regulation and private-sector implementation may be the most direct path toward a US version of affordable universal coverage.

Measuring Consumer Willingness to Pay to Reduce Health Risks of Contracting Dengue Fever.

Located in the subtropics, Taiwan is one of the major epidemic areas for dengue fever, with severe epidemics occurring in recent years. Dengue fever has become a serious health threat to Taiwan's residents and a potentially serious economic cost to society. This study recruited 730 random participants and adopted the contingent valuation method to understand the factors influencing the populace's willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce the health risk of dengue fever. The results show that high-income women with children and people with higher preventive perceptions and behavior are more willing to invest in preventive measures against dengue fever. In the evaluation of WTP for preventive treatment for health risks, each person was willing to pay on average NT$751 annually to lower psychological health risks, NT$793 annually to lower the risk of illness, and NT$1086 annually to lower the risk of death.

One-year costs of medical admissions with and without a 30-day readmission and enhanced risk adjustment.

BACKGROUND: To overcome the limitations of administrative data in adequately adjusting for differences in patients' risk of readmissions, recent studies have added supplemental data from patient surveys and other sources (e.g., electronic health records). However, judging the adequacy of enhanced risk adjustment for use in assessment of 30-day readmission as a hospital quality indicator is not straightforward. In this paper, we evaluate the adequacy of risk adjustment by comparing the one-year costs of those readmitted within 30 days to those not after excluding the costs of the readmission. METHODS: In this two-step study, we first used comprehensive administrative and survey data on a nationally representative Medicare cohort of hospitalized patients to compare patients with a medical admission who experienced a 30-day readmission to patients without a readmission in terms of their overall Medicare payments during 12 months following the index discharge. We then examined the extent to which a series of enhanced risk adjustment models incorporating code-based comorbidities, self-reported health status and prior healthcare utilization, reduced the payment differences between the admitted and not readmitted groups. RESULTS: Our analytic cohort consisted 4684 index medical hospitalization of which 842 met the 30-day readmission criteria. Those readmitted were more likely to be older, White, sicker and with higher healthcare utilization in the previous year. The unadjusted subsequent one-year Medicare spending among those readmitted ($56,856) was 60% higher than that among the non-readmitted ($35,465). Even with enhanced risk adjustment, and across a variety of sensitivity analyses, one-year Medicare spending remained substantially higher (46.6%, p < 0.01) among readmitted patients. CONCLUSIONS: Enhanced risk adjustment models combining health status indicators from administrative and survey data with previous healthcare utilization are unable to substantially reduce the cost differences between those medical admission patients readmitted within 30 days and those not. The unmeasured patient severity that these cost differences most likely reflect raises the question of the fairness of programs that place large penalties on hospitals with higher than expected readmission rates.

Deriving risk adjustment payment weights to maximize efficiency of health insurance markets.

Risk-adjustment is critical to the functioning of regulated health insurance markets. To date, estimation and evaluation of a risk-adjustment model has been based on statistical rather than economic objective functions. We develop a framework where the objective of risk-adjustment is to minimize the efficiency loss from service-level distortions due to adverse selection, and we use the framework to develop a welfare-grounded method for estimating risk-adjustment weights. We show that when the number of risk adjustor variables exceeds the number of decisions plans make about service allocations, incentives for service-level distortion can always be eliminated via a constrained least-squares regression. When the number of plan service-level allocation decisions exceeds the number of risk-adjusters, the optimal weights can be found by an OLS regression on a straightforward transformation of the data. We illustrate this method with the data used to estimate risk-adjustment payment weights in the Netherlands (N = 16.5 million).

Adoption of the Methodology for the HHS-Operated Permanent Risk Adjustment Program Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act for the 2017 Benefit Year. Final rule.

The Secretary of Education (Secretary) amends the regulations implementing Parts B and C of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). These conforming changes are needed to implement statutory amendments made to the IDEA by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), enacted on December 10, 2015. These regulations remove and revise IDEA definitions based on changes made to the definitions in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), as amended by the ESSA, and also update several State eligibility requirements to reflect amendments to the IDEA made by the ESSA. They also update relevant cross-references in the IDEA regulations to sections of the ESEA to reflect changes made by the ESSA. These regulations also include several technical corrections to previously published IDEA Part B regulations.

Getting What We Pay For: How Do Risk-Based Payments to Medicare Advantage Plans Compare with Alternative Measures of Beneficiary Health Risk?

OBJECTIVE: To estimate the relative health risk of Medicare Advantage (MA) beneficiaries compared to those in Traditional Medicare (TM). DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING: Medicare claims and enrollment records for the sample of beneficiaries enrolled in Part D between 2008 and 2015. STUDY DESIGN: We assigned therapeutic classes to Medicare beneficiaries based on their prescription drug utilization. We then regressed nondrug health spending for TM beneficiaries in 2015 on demographic and therapeutic class identifiers for 2014 and used coefficients from this regression to predict relative risk of both MA and TM beneficiaries. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Based on prescription drug utilization data, beneficiaries enrolled in MA in 2015 had 6.9 percent lower health risk than beneficiaries in TM, but differences based on coded diagnoses suggested MA beneficiaries were 6.2 percent higher risk. The relative health risk based on drug usage of MA beneficiaries compared to those in TM increased by 3.4 p.p. from 2008 to 2015, while the relative risk using diagnoses increased 9.8 p.p. CONCLUSIONS: Our results add to a growing body of evidence suggesting MA receives favorable, or, at worst, neutral selection. If MA beneficiaries are no healthier and no sicker than similar beneficiaries in TM, then payments to MA plans exceed what is warranted based on their health status.

New Risk-Adjustment Policies Reduce But Do Not Eliminate Special Enrollment Period Underpayment.

Millions of uninsured Americans do not sign up for available coverage despite job loss or other factors that would make them eligible for special enrollment periods (SEPs). Such periods let people enroll in nongroup insurance outside the usual open enrollment period for Marketplace coverage. Concerned that risk adjustment results in underpayment for the health risks associated with SEP enrollees, carriers rarely market their products to consumers eligible for SEPs, and many do not pay agents and brokers to enroll such consumers. To address the apparent underpayments, federal officials added enrollment duration factors that, starting in 2017, increased risk scores for SEP enrollees and other part-year members. Using individual-market claims data for 2015 from two large carriers, we found that risk adjustment did, in fact, undercompensate plans for part-year members. However, underpayment was much larger for SEP enrollees than for part-year members who joined during open enrollment periods. Short-term, urgent health problems appeared to drive enrollment more for SEP enrollees than for part-year members who signed up during open enrollment. We also found that the federal government's enrollment duration factors will remedy underpayment for part-year members whose coverage begins during open enrollment but leave carriers significantly underpaid for SEP enrollees. For carriers to recruit rather than avoid SEP enrollees, further increases to risk adjustment for such enrollees are likely needed.

Medicaid program choice, inertia and adverse selection.

In 2012, Kentucky implemented Medicaid managed care statewide, auto-assigned enrollees to three plans, and allowed switching. Using administrative data, we find that the state's auto-assignment algorithm most heavily weighted cost-minimization and plan balancing, and placed little weight on the quality of the enrollee-plan match. Immobility - apparently driven by health plan inertia - contributed to the success of the cost-minimization strategy, as more than half of enrollees auto-assigned to even the lowest quality plans did not opt-out. High-cost enrollees were more likely to opt-out of their auto-assigned plan, creating adverse selection. The plan with arguably the highest quality incurred the largest initial profit margin reduction due to adverse selection prior to risk adjustment, as it attracted a disproportionate share of high-cost enrollees. The presence of such selection, caused by differential degrees of mobility, raises concerns about the long run viability of the Medicaid managed care market without such risk adjustment.

Medicare and Medicaid Programs; CY 2018 Home Health Prospective Payment System Rate Update and CY 2019 Case-Mix Adjustment Methodology Refinements; Home Health Value-Based Purchasing Model; and Home Health Quality Reporting Requirements. Final rule.

This final rule updates the home health prospective payment system (HH PPS) payment rates, including the national, standardized 60-day episode payment rates, the national per-visit rates, and the non-routine medical supply (NRS) conversion factor, effective for home health episodes of care ending on or after January 1, 2018. This rule also: Updates the HH PPS case-mix weights using the most current, complete data available at the time of rulemaking; implements the third year of a 3-year phase-in of a reduction to the national, standardized 60-day episode payment to account for estimated case-mix growth unrelated to increases in patient acuity (that is, nominal case-mix growth) between calendar year (CY) 2012 and CY 2014; and discusses our efforts to monitor the potential impacts of the rebasing adjustments that were implemented in CY 2014 through CY 2017. In addition, this rule finalizes changes to the Home Health Value-Based Purchasing (HHVBP) Model and to the Home Health Quality Reporting Program (HH QRP). We are not finalizing the implementation of the Home Health Groupings Model (HHGM) in this final rule.

Risk Adjustment, Reinsurance Improved Financial Outcomes For Individual Market Insurers With The Highest Claims.

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) reformed the individual health insurance market. Because insurers can no longer vary their offers of coverage based on applicants' health status, the ACA established a risk adjustment program to equalize health-related cost differences across plans. The ACA also established a temporary reinsurance program to subsidize high-cost claims. To assess the impact of these programs, we compared revenues to claims costs for insurers in the individual market during the first two years of ACA implementation (2014 and 2015), before and after the inclusion of risk adjustment and reinsurance payments. Before these payments were included, for the 30 percent of insurers with the highest claims costs, claims (not including administrative expenses) exceeded premium revenues by $90-$397 per enrollee per month. The effect was reversed after these payments were included, with revenues exceeding claims costs by $0-$49 per month. The risk adjustment and reinsurance programs were relatively well targeted in the first two years. While there is ongoing discussion regarding the future of the ACA, our findings can shed light on how risk-sharing programs can address risk selection among insurers-a pervasive issue in all health insurance markets.

Risk-adjustment methods for all-payer comparative performance reporting in Vermont.

BACKGROUND: As the emphasis in health reform shifts to value-based payments, especially through multi-payer initiatives supported by the U.S. Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation, and with the increasing availability of statewide all-payer claims databases, the need for an all-payer, "whole-population" approach to facilitate the reporting of utilization, cost, and quality measures has grown. However, given the disparities between the different populations served by Medicare, Medicaid, and commercial payers, risk-adjustment methods for addressing these differences in a single measure have been a challenge. METHODS: This study evaluated different levels of risk adjustment for primary care practice populations - from basic adjustments for age and gender to a more comprehensive "full model" risk-adjustment method that included additional demographic, payer, and health status factors. It applied risk adjustment to populations attributed to patient-centered medical homes (283,153 adult patients and 78,162 pediatric patients) in the state of Vermont that are part of the Blueprint for Health program. Risk-adjusted expenditure and utilization outcomes for calendar year 2014 were reported in 102 adult and 56 pediatric primary-care comparative practice profiles. RESULTS: Using total expenditures as the dependent variable for the adult population, the r2 for the model adjusted for age and gender was 0.028. It increased to 0.265 with the additional adjustment for 3M Clinical Risk Groups and to 0.293 with the full model. For the adult population at the practice level, the no-adjustment model had the highest variation as measured by the coefficient of variation (18.5) compared to the age and gender model (14.8); the age, gender, and CRG model (13.0); and the full model (11.7). Similar results were found for the pediatric population practices. CONCLUSIONS: Results indicate that more comprehensive risk-adjustment models are effective for comparing cost, utilization, and quality measures across multi-payer populations. Such evaluations will become more important for practices, many of which do not distinguish their patients by payer type, and for the implementation of incentive-based or alternative payment systems that depend on "whole-population" outcomes. In Vermont, providers, accountable care organizations, policymakers, and consumers have used Blueprint profiles to identify priorities and opportunities for improving care in their communities.

Medicare Program; Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility Prospective Payment System for Federal Fiscal Year 2017. Final rule.

This final rule will update the prospective payment rates for inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRFs) for federal fiscal year (FY) 2017 as required by the statute. As required by section 1886(j)(5) of the Act, this rule includes the classification and weighting factors for the IRF prospective payment system's (IRF PPS's) case-mix groups and a description of the methodologies and data used in computing the prospective payment rates for FY 2017. This final rule also revises and updates quality measures and reporting requirements under the IRF quality reporting program (QRP).

Medicare Program; Prospective Payment System and Consolidated Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities for FY 2017, SNF Value-Based Purchasing Program, SNF Quality Reporting Program, and SNF Payment Models Research. Final rule.

This final rule updates the payment rates used under the prospective payment system (PPS) for skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) for fiscal year (FY) 2017. In addition, it specifies a potentially preventable readmission measure for the Skilled Nursing Facility Value-Based Purchasing Program (SNF VBP), and implements requirements for that program, including performance standards, a scoring methodology, and a review and correction process for performance information to be made public, aimed at implementing value-based purchasing for SNFs. Additionally, this final rule includes additional polices and measures in the Skilled Nursing Facility Quality Reporting Program (SNF QRP). This final rule also responds to comments on the SNF Payment Models Research (PMR) project.

Risk Adjustment for Medicare Total Knee Arthroplasty Bundled Payments.

The use of bundled payments is growing because of their potential to align providers and hospitals on the goal of cost reduction. However, such gain sharing could incentivize providers to "cherry-pick" more profitable patients. Risk adjustment can prevent this unintended consequence, yet most bundling programs include minimal adjustment techniques. This study was conducted to determine how bundled payments for total knee arthroplasty (TKA) should be adjusted for risk. The authors collected financial data for all Medicare patients (age≥65 years) undergoing primary unilateral TKA at an academic center over a period of 2 years (n=941). Multivariate regression was performed to assess the effect of patient factors on the costs of acute inpatient care, including unplanned 30-day readmissions. This analysis mirrors a bundling model used in the Medicare Bundled Payments for Care Improvement initiative. Increased age, American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) class, and the presence of a Medicare Major Complications/Comorbid Conditions (MCC) modifier (typically representing major complications) were associated with increased costs (regression coefficients, $57 per year; $729 per ASA class beyond I; and $3122 for patients meeting MCC criteria; P=.003, P=.001, and P<.001, respectively). Differences in costs were not associated with body mass index, sex, or race. If the results are generalizable, Medicare bundled payments for TKA encompassing acute inpatient care should be adjusted upward by the stated amounts for older patients, those with elevated ASA class, and patients meeting MCC criteria. This is likely an underestimate for many bundling models, including the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement program, incorporating varying degrees of postacute care. Failure to adjust for factors that affect costs may create adverse incentives, creating barriers to care for certain patient populations. [Orthopedics. 2016; 39(5):e911-e916.].

Risk-Adjustment Simulation: Plans May Have Incentives To Distort Mental Health And Substance Use Coverage.

Under the Affordable Care Act, the risk-adjustment program is designed to compensate health plans for enrolling people with poorer health status so that plans compete on cost and quality rather than the avoidance of high-cost individuals. This study examined health plan incentives to limit covered services for mental health and substance use disorders under the risk-adjustment system used in the health insurance Marketplaces. Through a simulation of the program on a population constructed to reflect Marketplace enrollees, we analyzed the cost consequences for plans enrolling people with mental health and substance use disorders. Our assessment points to systematic underpayment to plans for people with these diagnoses. We document how Marketplace risk adjustment does not remove incentives for plans to limit coverage for services associated with mental health and substance use disorders. Adding mental health and substance use diagnoses used in Medicare Part D risk adjustment is one potential policy step toward addressing this problem in the Marketplaces.

Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program; Accountable Care Organizations--Revised Benchmark Rebasing Methodology, Facilitating Transition to Performance-Based Risk, and Administrative Finality of Financial Calculations. Final rule.

Under the Medicare Shared Savings Program (Shared Savings Program), providers of services and suppliers that participate in an Accountable Care Organization (ACO) continue to receive traditional Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) payments under Parts A and B, but the ACO may be eligible to receive a shared savings payment if it meets specified quality and savings requirements. This final rule addresses changes to the Shared Savings Program, including: Modifications to the program's benchmarking methodology, when resetting (rebasing) the ACO's benchmark for a second or subsequent agreement period, to encourage ACOs' continued investment in care coordination and quality improvement; an alternative participation option to encourage ACOs to enter performance-based risk arrangements earlier in their participation under the program; and policies for reopening of payment determinations to make corrections after financial calculations have been performed and ACO shared savings and shared losses for a performance year have been determined.

Atrial flutter and atrial fibrillation ablation - sequential or combined? A cost-benefit and risk analysis of primary prevention pulmonary vein ablation.

BACKGROUND: Recent studies have tested the hypothesis that preventive pulmonary vein isolation (PVI) at time of atrial flutter ablation in patients who have not had atrial fibrillation (AF) will reduce future incidence of AF. OBJECTIVE: To model relative procedural costs, risks, and benefits of sequential versus combined ablation strategies. METHODS: The decision model compares a sequential ablation strategy of atrial flutter ablation, followed by future PVI if necessary, with an initial combined flutter and preventive PVI ablation strategy. Assumptions are AF incidence 20% per year, PVI success rate 70%, PVI complication rate 4%, atrial flutter complication rate 1%, and costs $13,056 for PVI and $8,466 for atrial flutter ablation. RESULTS: The sequential ablation strategy is less expensive, at 1.4 vs 1.6 expected flutter ablation equivalents (FAE) ($11,852 vs $13,545) per patient, and entails less average risk, at 2% vs 4%. A combined ablation strategy is more expensive if the relative cost of PVI is more than 24.6% higher than atrial flutter ablation. A combined ablation strategy has higher total risk if PVI procedural risk is 24.6% more than atrial flutter ablation. CONCLUSIONS: Under base case assumptions of relative cost of PVI to flutter ablation 1.5 and relative risk 4, a sequential ablation approach has less total expected cost and less expected risk. There appears to be no compelling reason to adopt a combined ablation approach into standard practice. Nomograms are presented to allow the reader to assess which strategy is preferred according to local relative costs and risk.